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China’s Authoritarian Market Economy
Gary Krueger1
I. Introduction
After three decades of isolation under Mao, the Chinese economy 
has undergone what is arguably the most profound economic transfor-
mation in the last several centuries. In Mao’s China, the economy was 
classified as primarily agrarian and socialist. The post-Mao Chinese 
economic system (“Dengism”), in which public ownership remained 
significant, at least early on, but allocation of resources took place 
mostly via the market, presents some significant challenges in the field 
of comparative economic systems. What exists today is an economic 
system in which the market, albeit with increasing private ownership, 
dominates the allocation of resources, but which operates under an 
authoritarian political system. This results in an unusual political and 
economic structure that has some obvious benefits and largely hidden 
costs.
This article endeavors to address some of the challenges China’s 
unique economic system poses for comparative economists, and in 
the process to shed light on the enigmatic character of China’s current 
economic arrangements. The central thesis of the essay argues that 
the combination of a market economy with an authoritarian political 
system has some distinct advantages as a developmental economic 
instrument, but it also has significant disadvantages that may become 
increasingly obvious as China’s economy matures.
The essay is divided into four sections. Following this introduction, 
Section II introduces the basic field of comparative economics and the 
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generally accepted tools of economic classification. Section III provides 
a basic background of China’s economy under Mao and a brief outline 
of the reforms enacted under Deng. Section IV discusses the unique-
ness of the authoritarian market economy and provides some concrete 
examples of the operation of China’s economy based on my indepen-
dent research in a newly privatized poultry producer and an examina-
tion of the Three Gorges dam project.
II. Comparative Economic Systems
Historically, the field of comparative economic systems relied on own-
ership, public versus private, as a first approximation of categoriz-
ing economic systems. Generally speaking, the ownership mechanism 
was closely linked to the dominant form of allocation: central plan-
ning or market. Under this system the United States was classified as 
a capitalist (private ownership of the means of production) market 
economy and the Soviet Union was a socialist (public ownership of the 
means of production) centrally planned economy. Of course economic 
arrangements and economic systems were never monolithic and pub-
lic ownership of significant fractions of the economy exists in capitalist 
market economies while private ownership and market mechanisms 
are frequently used in (generally isolated) sectors of socialist planned 
economies.2
Although the field of comparative economic systems tended to 
ignore the political structures associated with market/capitalist and 
planned socialist economic systems, capitalist market economies 
tended to be dominated by parliamentary or representative democra-
cies, while socialist planned economies were governed by authoritarian 
communist dictatorships. Exceptions were, of course, Nazi Germany 
during World War II, in which resources were generally privately 
owned, but allocation decisions were closely controlled by the state as 
in a centrally planned economy; and the military dictatorships of Latin 
America in which private ownership and market allocation coexisted 
with an authoritarian political system. In this respect, on the face of 
it, China today appears closest to the Latin American model than any 
other alternative.3
Within the set of each basic category of economic system important 
differences exist. Among the capitalist market economies, continental 
Europe and Japan tend towards significant government intervention 
in the economy, either overtly or relying on more subtle means. The 
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United States and the United Kingdom (especially under Margaret 
Thatcher) avoid direct intervention in the economy whenever possible 
and instead prefer adjustments in the “rules of the game” when prob-
lems arise. Among the Socialist planned economies similar variations 
existed. In Hungary central planning was eliminated at the wholesale 
level in the late 1960s, while in Poland collectivization of agriculture 
was abandoned in the late 1950s.
III: China’s Economy since 1950
While the Nationalist Chinese were defeated in 1949, the Chinese effort 
to build a socialist economic system did not begin until the end of the 
Korean War in 1952, with the adoption of the first five-year plan, which 
was to run until 1957. Not surprisingly, given the absence of clear alter-
natives, China’s initial attempts at constructing socialism were pat-
terned closely on the Soviet economic model. The first five-year plan 
was heavily influenced by the legions of Soviet advisors who were 
responsible for much of what was to become the Chinese economy. 
Large state-owned industrial enterprises, controlled from Beijing, were 
established, agriculture was collectivized, and private ownership abol-
ished. In the plan itself, priority was directed toward firms in heavy 
industry at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods industries. 
The role of money in allocating resources was reduced or eliminated, 
and trade with Western market economies was curtailed significantly.
Due in part to the Sino-Soviet split of the late 1950s, and more 
importantly to the discontent with the results of the first five-year 
plan, in 1957 China embarked on its own, uniquely Maoist, path. The 
primary source of discontent with the first five-year plan was the sense 
that Soviet-style heavy industry was ill suited to China’s mostly rural 
and peasant-dominated economic situation. The official policy change 
was known as “the Great Leap Forward,” a central feature of which 
was reprioritizing the agricultural and rural economy and deempha-
sizing heavy industry. It was during this period that a uniquely Chi-
nese, or Maoist economic system began to emerge. A central feature 
of Maoism was “self-reliance,” in which China sought independence 
from foreign economic engagements. The concept of self-reliance was 
taken to extremes during the Great Leap Forward under the strategy 
of “walking on two legs,” in which the rural agricultural sector was 
to operate independently of the urban industrial sector.4 The classical 
manifestation of this policy was the well known “backyard steel fur-
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naces,” in which collective farms made their own steel from primitive 
ovens. In addition to operating independently of the urban industrial 
sector, self-reliance was taken further. At the “brigade” level of collec-
tive farms, individual brigades were to operate more or less indepen-
dently of each other.5
To those familiar with basic principles of economics, one might 
anticipate the outcome of Maoist-type reforms, and the Great Leap 
Forward did not fail to deliver, resulting in massive famine in which 
millions starved. Much as Lenin did in the mid-1920s in the Soviet 
Union, Mao was forced to backtrack on his reforms and under the 
guidance of Liu Shiao-Chi and his then-deputy Deng Xiaoping, more 
market-oriented reforms were implemented in the countryside, and by 
1963–64 the economy recovered.
The improved economy emboldened the core left-wingers in 
the Communist Party, so Liu Shiao-Chi and Deng Xiaoping were 
denounced as “capitalist roaders” and purged from their leadership 
positions. China receded into the morass known as the “Cultural Revo-
lution,” which lasted from 1966 to 1976 and the death of Mao. Not 
surprisingly, given the political instability and the disastrous economic 
policies, the Chinese economy, as measured on a per capita GDP basis, 
was stagnant from 1952 to 1976. That is, growth in per capita GDP was 
basically zero for 25 years.
With the demise of the Gang of Four and General Secretary Hua 
Guofang, Deng Xiaoping emerged as the undisputed leader of the 
Communist Party of China in 1978. Deng sought to quickly end the 
economic stagnation under Mao, embarked on the “Four Moderniza-
tions,” and implemented the “Rural Responsibility System” (later to be 
known as the “Household Responsibility System” or HRS), in which 
rural peasants or groups of peasants could lease land from the collec-
tive for five- and later for 15-year periods.6 Leaseholders were allowed 
to keep any residual earnings they possessed after payments for mate-
rials and rents to the collective farm. Participation in the HRS mush-
roomed. By 1983, 99 percent of peasant farmers were leasing their land 
independently from the collective.7
The advantages of specialization and trade in agriculture and the 
improved incentives for farmers resulted in robust increases in farm 
income in the first half of the 1980s, which farmers promptly plowed 
back into purchases of goods and services from the local township and 
village enterprises (TVEs). While the growth in agricultural income 
stagnated in the second half of the 1980s, the growth in the quasi-
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private TVEs was astounding, averaging nearly 25 percent per year, 
with productivity growth at 22 percent per year from 1980 to the mid-
1990s.8
Coupled with the HRS, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed 
the significant opening of the economy to foreign firms. Initially in 
Shanghai and in Guanzou (bordering Hong Kong) foreign firms were 
allowed to set up joint ventures in so-called “Special Economic Zones,” 
which allowed foreign firms to keep their profits and also to own up to 
49 percent of the joint venture.
In the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen Square, foreign involve-
ment in the Chinese economy cooled, as did economic growth. Infla-
tion also rose dramatically in the early 1990s as the central government 
was starved for revenue while still spending to support the social-
ist sector of the economy.9 In the mid-1990s the privileges that were 
formerly confined to the Special Economic Zones were broadened to 
include the entire country, and foreign firms were permitted to own 
their own facilities without the necessity of a Chinese partner or the 
restriction that they own less than half of the joint venture.
Not surprisingly, foreign investment in China exploded, as did eco-
nomic growth, this time without the inflation of the early 1990s. Eco-
nomic growth continued without pause for the first half of this decade 
and the Chinese government continued its path toward economic lib-
eralization, eventually meeting the requirements for WTO admission 
by 2002.
IV. China’s Authoritarian Market Economy
The unique history of China—from stagnation and turmoil to sustained 
economic growth at unprecedented levels—raises important issues for 
students of transition economics in particular, as well as more gener-
ally for those interested in the process of economic development per 
se. For transition economists, China is often held up as a “gradual” 
reformer. Given the excellent performance of China, the gradual transi-
tion to a market economy is clearly preferable to the “Shock Therapy” 
adopted in the former USSR and Central Europe, both of which had 
greater difficulties in the transition to a market economy.
While these views are often repeated in the popular media and 
academic journals, the characterizations of China as gradualist and 
Russia as pursuing Shock Therapy are problematic. If we consider the 
cornerstone of Dengism to be the HRS—and note that it was effectively 
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introduced and penetrated the entire agricultural system in four years, 
or about the same time it took for Stalin to complete his collectivization 
of agriculture—then the “gradual” nature of Chinese reform does not 
appear all that gradual. At the same time, Russia did not adopt a law 
permitting the ownership of agricultural land until the year 2001, ten 
years after the fall of communism, and even then foreigners are not 
permitted to own land.
So while we may dismiss the gradual versus shock therapy debate 
when looking at China, we cannot so readily ignore the possibility 
that China’s authoritarian political structure is beneficial to economic 
development, and possibly also to the transition process itself. Gener-
ally speaking, authoritarianism is regarded by economists as detrimen-
tal to the development process for several reasons. First, authoritarian 
governments tend to lack self-restraint in matters of corruption and 
contract enforcement, which reduces investment from the domestic 
private sector and foreign firms. Second, McGuire and Olson have 
shown that relative to democracies, authoritarian governments have 
an incentive to under-invest in public goods and extract more rev-
enue from private citizens than would democratic systems.10 Finally, 
authoritarian governments may be unstable, or at least their laws and 
edicts are more likely to change quickly than in a democratic system, 
once again reducing the incentive for investors, who tend to shy away 
from instability when investing their assets. On the other hand, there 
are some clear advantages to a streamlined decision-making process 
generally associated with authoritarianism, including the ability to 
concentrate and marshal scarce resources quickly.
A. Evidence from Three Gorges
The central question as to the efficacy of the authoritarian market 
economy is the degree to which authoritarian governments can exer-
cise self-restraint and therefore avoid the disincentives to investment, 
while at the same time obtaining the advantages of the ability to set 
priorities and concentrate resources quickly. Additionally, authoritar-
ian systems are generally more empowered to undertake large “gigan-
tomania” projects that are less likely to receive support in democracies. 
Assessing the costs and benefits of these projects is extremely diffi-
cult. Authoritarian systems often err, underestimating the true costs 
and overestimating the benefits, leading to the creation of “white ele-
phants.”11 The Three Gorges dam provides an excellent example of a 
Macalester International  Vol. 18
220
massive scale project that arguably could only have been executed in 
an authoritarian political environment.
While the prospect of building a large dam to control the periodic 
flooding of the Yangtze and its tributaries had been under consider-
ation for most of the 20th century,12 serious planning and construc-
tion did not begin until 1993. The dam itself is one of the largest in 
the world, and its primary function is to provide flood control for the 
Yangtze River below Yichang by raising the water level above Yichang 
from 63 meters to the eventual level of 156 meters in 2008. At its cur-
rent level of 135 meters, it is now possible for barge traffic of significant 
scale to reach into the heart of Sichuan province and the Chongqing 
special administrative district, which is home to 25 million people and 
a key element in Beijing’s effort to promote economic development 
away from the heavily populated coastal regions. Finally, the dam 
will provide 18,200 megawatts of much needed hydroelectric capacity 
for China’s increasingly energy hungry economy.13 In terms of flood 
control, the Three Gorges dam will protect the large cities of Yichang, 
Wuhan, Nanjing, and Shanghai, home to approximately 400 million 
people. While Shanghai has not flooded since the 1970s, Wuhan has 
flooded severely in 1998, killing an estimated 4,000 people.14 Nanjing 
was severely threatened with flooding in 2002.
While there are indeed tremendous benefits to the project, there 
have been tremendous costs. Leaving aside the cost of the dam itself 
(estimated to be in the vicinity of U.S. $25 billion15), the flooded area in 
Sichuan requires the relocation of up to 1.3 million people, the elimi-
nation and removal of numerous cities and towns, and the loss of 
considerable cropland throughout the entire river basin, including its 
countless tributaries. Less directly observable costs include the con-
struction of massive retaining walls in every major city and town to 
prevent soil erosion and landslides. These retaining walls are of signifi-
cant scale and are intended to protect almost 100 meters of riverbank, 
up to 175 meters above sea level, in cities and towns throughout the 
river basin, all of which need to be completed before the basin is filled 
to 156 from its current level of 135.
While cost estimates are uncertain—it is highly doubtful that any-
thing close to the true economic costs of the project are known or 
knowable—one can make the argument that the benefits of the project 
probably outweigh the costs.16 Assuming for the sake of argument that 
this is indeed true, the central question is whether this project could 
have been implemented in an alternative political environment? In 
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other words, is it conceivable that this project could emerge from a 
democratic political process?
If we look around the globe at democratic market economies, we do 
see large projects that have transformed significant regions; examples 
include the “Big Dig” in Boston, the Euro Tunnel connecting England 
to the continent of Europe, and the U.S. interstate highway system. 
Although these projects are all of significant scale, they differ from the 
Three Gorges in significant ways. The Big Dig and the Euro Tunnel, 
while large, required relatively little relocation of citizens, thus reduc-
ing political opposition from those most directly affected by the project. 
While the interstate highway system involved significant disruption 
and the relocation of many people in mostly poorer neighborhoods, 
the impacts were diffuse regionally and spread out over a period of 
several decades while the system was under construction. By contrast, 
the Three Gorges dam was mostly completed a little less than a decade 
after construction began in 1997. However, like the Three Gorges proj-
ect, the cost effectiveness of these massive projects is always difficult to 
discern, and rarely (if at all) do the benefits significantly outweigh the 
costs.17
The advantages of the authoritarian system over democratic sys-
tems appear to be the ability to entertain a greater number of proj-
ects of a scale that developed market democracies generally cannot, 
especially if they affect large numbers (millions) of citizens, as well as 
to accomplish the project as rapidly as technologically possible. How-
ever, much like the Euro Tunnel, the Three Gorges dam may prove to 
be less beneficial than anticipated. Sedimentation at the base of the 
dam may reduce flow through the hydroelectric generators and the 
lifetime of the dam from 100 years to something substantially less. 
Already problems with soil saturation and the resulting landslides at 
the current level of 135 meters have occurred, with the possibility of 
more to come as the water level is increased. The lack of sedimentation 
at the mouth of the river in the East China Sea is already threatening 
the shoreline near Shanghai, possibly requiring costly levies and dikes 
to protect the city. Finally, there is a risk of dam failure due to poor 
construction. Much like the Big Dig in Boston, corruption plagued the 
Three Gorges dam in the early part of the century and it is unknown 
if the project meets all required design specifications. Finally, although 
the Three Gorges dam will prevent flooding from the Sichuan basin 
upstream, the river system below the dam may still threaten the area 
around Wuhan, home to eight million people. Much as in the SARS 
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outbreak in 2004, if any of these events come to play it is unlikely that 
China’s authoritarian government will recognize them until the situa-
tion is out of control.
B. A Privatized Poultry Firm
As noted earlier, the township village enterprises were an important 
source of economic growth in the first two decades of Dengism. As 
also noted, the TVEs remained a unique feature of China’s economy, 
enjoying a status somewhere in between private and public ownership, 
and facing considerable competition from TVEs in adjacent regions. 
Despite the success in productivity and growth, it is not clear if most 
TVEs were profitable in the sense that they covered the costs of their 
capital. The primary reason for this opacity was the banking system 
in China. Banks were controlled by the government, and household 
deposits were channeled to whichever government projects seemed 
most worthy. Local governments, therefore, had significant influence 
as to the investment resources available to the TVE, which could be 
used to cover losses, even though the firm was growing rapidly.
Beginning in 2000 this began to change and TVEs were privatized 
and local government removed from control of TVE management. In 
Shanghai I had the opportunity to interview the president of a newly 
privatized poultry producer/processor. The firm is one of the largest 
suppliers to YUM brand’s Kentucky Fried Chicken, the largest fast 
food network in China.18
The firm is located in Shangdon province to the south of Beijing, 
and employs 1,000 full-time and 6,000 part-time employees. The cur-
rent level of employment represents a 250 percent increase in overall 
employment since privatization in 2001 and a doubling of full time 
employees. Since 2001, the firm has registered substantial increases 
in total production, raising the number of chickens processed per day 
from 70,000 to 200,000 and introducing new production in ducks, of 
which the firm currently processes 50,000 a day (from zero in 2001). 
Compared to the overall economy that has been growing at 8–10 per-
cent per year since 2000, the poultry producer is growing some 3–4 
times faster.19
In terms of overall finances, the firm pays respectable wages of 
1,200 yuan per month (based on average piece work per person) which 
translates to $1,800 per year at market exchange rates, but when adjust-
ing for cost of living is closer to $5,000 per year. It is also worth noting 
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that the firm provides free housing and uniforms to its workers. Prior 
to privatization, according to the President, the firm was not profitable: 
“We did not run well in 2000, which was the main reason we needed 
to be privatized.” In 2006, the firm was earning 15.8 percent return on 
investment, and on sales of 1.58 billion yuan the firm made 80 million 
in profit.
Given the rapid growth of YUM in China, accounting for up to one-
third of YUM brands total profit worldwide, the demand for poultry 
remains strong.20 According to the President of the company, in order 
to keep pace with growth in YUM’s China operations, the firm plans to 
double capacity in the next five years. The expansion is to be financed 
out of retained earnings, bank loans, and possibly a foreign investor.
This post-privatization success is no doubt related, in part, to the 
tight governance structure of the firm. While most of the 500 full-time 
workers owned shares at the time of privatization in 2000, the vast 
majority of shares are concentrated in top management. Since priva-
tization, ownership has been further concentrated as workers sold 
their shares to management. The Chairman of the Board, the former 
plant manager, owns 40 percent, the President 12 percent, and the two 
remaining members of the Board own 16 percent. Middle managers 
control an additional 32 percent. By transition economics standards, 
the firm’s ownership structure is very concentrated and appears to 
be closer to a limited partnership/sole proprietorship than a publicly 
traded company like one sees in developed market economies. To 
summarize this case study: on the one hand, the firm has grown signif-
icantly, is now profitable, and is planning on significant expansion; on 
the other hand, the distribution of ownership has become significantly 
more unequal and the role of the local government has been eliminated 
in the operations of the firm.
V. Conclusion
The large Three Gorges project and the newly privatized poultry pro-
ducer provide interesting contrasts into the future of China’s economy. 
While the Three Gorges project is an amazing accomplishment and is 
more likely than not to yield benefits in excess of costs for many years, 
it arguably could only have happened under an authoritarian govern-
ment. The question remains whether China will need another project 
on the scale of the Three Gorges. If not, then the benefits of the authori-
tarian economic structure as an instrument of development might be in 
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the past. The vitality and profitability of the poultry producer, while no 
doubt due in part to rapid growth in the economy, is also attributable 
to the positive incentives of privatization and ownership. Of course, 
the positive-incentive effects of private ownership require that govern-
ments respect property rights. Enforcement of property rights presup-
poses self-restraint on the part of government, which is fundamentally 
at odds with an authoritarian regime. In effect, the different levels of 
government appear increasingly willing to exercise self-restraint in 
exchange for improved economic performance in the private sector. 
Yet this “self-restraint” tends to be imposed from Beijing rather than 
organically, or voluntarily, originating at the local government level. 
So while the future of the authoritarian government structure in China 
appears in doubt, the transition to a more democratic system may not 
happen smoothly. Rather, tensions between Beijing and regional gov-
ernments are likely to increase significantly in the next decade. •
Notes
1. The author wishes to thank the Macalester College Faculty Development International 
Seminar for making this research possible. Special thanks go out to Xi Luo and Holly 
Barcus for comments and research support on this project. Errors are the responsibility 
of the author.
2. For example, under the most severe periods of Stalinism, rural peasants sold surplus 
crops in a free collective-farm market. Throughout most of Soviet history, labor was allo-
cated via a quasi-market mechanism. See Granick 1987.
3. Yet the performance of the Chinese economy has been astounding while the econo-
mies of Latin America mainly stagnated for most of the 20th century. This article exam-
ines some important differences that may explain the variations in performance.
4. See Eckstein, Chapter 2, for an excellent description of the Great Leap and Maoism.
5. Under Mao, Chinese collective agriculture was organized in a hierarchy beginning 
with the household, groups of households (teams), groups of teams of approximately 
1,000 people (brigades), and communes (groups of brigades). Communes later became 
the Townships and Villages, which we see today.
6. At this time Deng is reportedly to have said, “It does not matter if a cat is white or 
black as long as it catches mice.”
7. See Naughton 1995, p. 141.
8. Weitzman and Xu refer to the TVEs as a “vaguely defined cooperative” in which the 
owner is the local village or township, but the profits are shared among the local govern-
ment, the workers, and the managers of the firm. Weitzman and Xu 1994.
9. Central government revenue as a fraction of GDP fell to less than 3 percent in 1993. See 
Gordon and Li 2002, p. 20. By comparison, the federal government of the U.S. collects 
approximately 20 percent of U.S. GDP.
10. McGuire and Olson 1996.
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11. The official web site of the Three Gorges project lists only benefits of the project and 
makes no mention of the monetary costs.
12. The original proposal to build a large dam on the Yangtze was made in 1919 under 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
13. For comparison purposes, 18,200 megawatts is about the electric capacity of the 
greater Chicago area.
14. An additional benefit of the dam is the economic and other forms of development 
along the riverbanks of these cities. In Wuhan there is now a sizable park that runs for 
miles along what was periodically flooded and undeveloped territory.
15. Both the International River Network and Wikipedia.com cite the $25 billion figure, 
while Morimoto and Hope use $50 billion in their more sophisticated cost-benefit model. 
The $25 billion is the figure most frequently cited, but this appears to include only the 
direct costs of the dam and most likely does not include the indirect costs of retaining 
wall construction and the relocation of 1.3 million citizens.
16. Morimoto and Hope calculate that the benefits will outweigh the costs after 25 years 
and will continue to add $50 billion to national income for 75 years thereafter. They esti-
mate that there is a 5% chance, however, that throughout the entire 100-year life of the 
project, costs exceed the benefits. Morimoto and Hope, p. 212.
17. As of this writing, the Governor of Massachusetts has closed the “Big Dig” tun-
nels due to poor construction, which resulted in the death of a 38-year-old woman. 
Since opening in the early 1990s, the Euro-Tunnel has carried only 38 and 24 percent of 
anticipated passenger and rail traffic, respectively. See the website http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Chunnel#Construction.
18. YUM’s Annual Report lists over 1,900 KFC restaurants in China versus slightly more 
than 700 for McDonalds.
19. According to data from www.Economist.com, accessed on 13 August 2006.
20. In 2005, YUM’s KFC U.S. sales were $1.4 billion, while its China sales were $1.0 billion 
(YUM Brand Annual Report), and the firm opened 400 new restaurants.
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